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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HARRY _A_LEX_._\~DER, RALPH H.
ALEXANDER and E·r-EL YN ALEXANDER. HO\YICK,
Pla-intiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST
CO~IP ANY, a corporation,

Case- No. 8042

Defendant,

and

HANNAH WILSON ALEXANDER,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION F·OR REHEARING AND BRIEF·
IN SUPPORT THEREOF:

PETITION F'OR REHEARING
COME now HARRY ALEXANDER, RALPH H.
ALEXANDER and EVELYN ALEXANDER H·OWICK, respondents herein, an;d respectfully petition this
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Honorable c·ourt for a rehearing in the a~bove-entitled
case and to vacate the Order of this Court herein reversing the judgment entered thereon by the trial court.
This petition is based upon the following grounds:

POIN·T I.
The conclusion of this Court that the word "vest",
1

as used in a typical spendthrift trust clause conclusively
establishes that a trust agreement is testamentary is a
proposition that has at no time been raised or argued by
appellant either at the trial or on this appeal; therefore, the dictates of justice and respect for the trial eourt
would seem to require that respondents be given the right
to argue and submit authorities ·as to whether the spendthrift trust clause and particularly the word "ve·st" should
be accorded the remarkable significance given it by this
court in its op·inion.

POINT· II.
This Court 'Should reconsider a decision which has
defeated the intent of the settlor by an utter disregard of
the clear purport of the trust instrument. Paragraph
5 of said instrument refers to "* * *interests * * * created
hereby * * *." Yet this Court has declared that the settlor
did not intend to create an interest thereby, ·and 'for that
reason alone has defeated the trust agreement.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III.
This Court has erroneously decided tha,t the trust instrunlent must fail because the interest of the beneficiaries did not immediately vest in possession. The test
this Court should have applied in determining validity
of the trust agreen1ent is whether or not said agreement
bona fidely transferred a property interest from trustor
to trustee.
Accompanying this Petition and filed herewith is a
Brief in support hereof.
JOHN L. BLACK,
Attorney for Respondernts

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
CERTIFICA·TE OF COUNSEL
I hereby certify that I am the attorney for the respondents, petitioners herein, and that in my opinion
there is good cause to believe the judgment oibjected to is
erroneous and that the case ought to be re-examined as
prayed for in said Petition.
DATED this ------------ day of September, 19·54.
JOHN L. BLACK
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RECEIVE:Q a copy of the foregoing Petition and
Brief in support thereof this ····-------- day of September,
1954.
GRANT' H. BAGLEY
D. EUGENE LIVINGS·TON
DAVID E. SALISBURY
Attorneys for Defendant a;nd
Appellant

BRIEF IN ·sUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
POINT I.
THE CONCLUSION OF THIS COURT THAT THE WORD
"VEST", AS USED IN A TYPICAL SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
CLAUSE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT A TRUST
AGREEMENT IS TESTAMENTARY IS A PROPOSITION
THAT HAS AT NO TIME BEEN RAISED OR ARGUED BY
APPELLANT EITHER AT THE TRIAL OR ON THIS APPEAL; THEREFORE, THE DI·CTATES OF JUSTICE AND
RESPECT FOR THE TRIAL COURT WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE THAT RESPONDENTS BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO
ARGUE AND SUBMIT AUTHORITIES AS TO WHETHER
THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST CLAUSE AND PARTICULARLY
THE WORD "VEST" SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE REMARKABLE SIGNIFICANCE GIVEN IT BY THIS COURT
IN ITS OPINION.

It ·can be ascertained from reading the Brief of Appellant that no contention was made that the trust in question was invalid for the reason stated in the opinion filed,
i.e., that the· spendthrift trust clause 'showed a sp,ecific
intent that no Tight should vest in plaintiffs, at least until
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
the death of the surviving settlor. Inasmuch as this point
\vas not urged in appellant's brief, respondents did not
have the op·portunity to meet such contention either by
brief or by oral argument.
In the case of People ex rel. Park R.eservoir Co. v.
Hinderlider et a.l., 98 Colo. 505, 57 P. 2d 894, the Sup·reme
Court of Colorado reversed a judgment for reasons not
assigned in any of the briefs or oral arguments of counsel. On Petition for Rehearing the Court held that defendants in error 'vere entitled to a rehearing to ~argue
the points on which the decision was :based. The foregoing case is representative of the great weight of authority.
It is particularly fitting that respondents should he
granted a rehearing in this case where the brusis of thi'S
Court's opinion is unique in the field of trust law, and
has the effect of making questionable spendthrift clauses
in common use in most of the banking institutions of this
state and by the legal profession generally.
P·OINT II.
THIS COURT SHOULD RE~CONSIDER A DECISION
WHICH HAS DEFEATED THE INTENT OF THE SETTLOR
BY AN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE CLEAR PURPORT
OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT. PARAGRAPH 5 OF SAID
INSTRUMENT REFERS TO "* -x- * INTERESTS * * * CREATED HEREBY***." YET THIS COURT HAS DECLARED
THAT THE SETTLOR DID NOT INTEND TO CREATE AN
INTEREST THEREBY, AND FOR THAT REASON ALONE
HAS DEFEATED THE TRUST AGREEMENT.
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It can be seen from reading the Trust Agreement
that according 'to the general scheme the trustors first
described the trust fund and aS'signed and transferred it
to the trustee; next, expressed the reservation of the
rights of revocation and amendment and of changing
beneficiaries; next, de~scribed how the residue and reInainder of said trust fund should be distr:i:buted upon the
death of the survivor in specifically designated shares to
specifically design·ated beneficiaries; next, specified the
po,vers of the trustee, and then included paragraph 5.
By reading over paragraph 5 of the Trust Agreement it
can easily be seen that thrs is a paragraph which is comnlonly called a "spendthrift trust" clause. Spendthrift
trust clauses are ordinarily used for the purpose of pro~
tecting beneficiaries from creditors and also from the-ir
own tendency to anticipate any of the benefits before
they are entitled to receive them. This paragraph was
seized on by the court to invalidate the entire Trust
Agreement as testamentary merely because the statement
was made that "The respective interests of beneficiaries
in the Trust Fund created hereby shall in no case vest in
such beneficiaries until they, respectively, shall become
entitled to receive and demand, absolutely and forthwith,
the income or principal of the said Trust Fund to which
they, respectively, may be entitled hereunder." Even at
the beginning of the paragraph the trustors lra.ve spoken
of the "respective interest'S of beneficiaries in the Trust
Fund created hereby" and later on in the same paragraph
it is. stated, "* * * the interests of said beneficiar·ies, and
each of them, either in the principal or the: income 'Shall
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not be liable in any 1nanner or to any extent for the obligations or liabilities, voluntary or involuntary, of the
said beneficiaries, or either or any of them, of whatsoever
character."
It is certainly an anomalous situation when the
trustors haYe been so careful and meticulous about drawing up a Trust Agreement and specifying the beneficiaries and the respective shares of said beneficiaries in the
trust fund and then added a clause for the express p·urpose of protecting said beneficiaries, to have the court
hold that such clause indicates that the trustors intende·d
that said beneficiaries have nothing more than a mere
expectancy at the time of the creation of the trust. F'urthermore, the wording, even in the spendthrift trust
clause, specifically recognizes that said beneficiaries
have an interest. It is respectfully submitted that the
purpose of the spendthrift trust clause is to p·rotect the
interests of the beneficiaries and not to provide that
said beneficiaries have no interest other than a mere exp·ectancy. It is well known law that an expectancy is not
assignable. See Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 86.1, where
it is stated:

"* * * It does not follow, however, that the
expectant heir or legatee has before the death of
the aneestor or testator such a property interest
as can be presently assigned by him or made the
subject of a trust."
If the settlors me·ant to give the beneficiaries nothing
more than a mere expectancy, it is indeed strange that
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they ~hould then attempt to make this expectancy nonassignable when an expectancy is not assignable anyway..
li"urthermore, it is strange that they should attempt to
place thi~s expectancy in a trust when an expectancy cannot be 1nade the subject of a trust.
Furthermore, in paragraph 3 of the Trust AgreeInent special provisions are made for the handling of the
trust property after the death of the survivor of the
trustors in case one or more of the two grandchildren are
still under legal age. It is provided that if such is the
case, the trustee, if it deems advisable, shall use its business discretion and provide proper care, support, maintenance and education for the minor grandchildren prior
to said grandchildren coming of legal age, and it is further stated:

"* * * In the event that either of said two
grandchildren shall die before receiving the full
portion of the Trust Fund to which he or she is
entitled hereunder, the share of such deceased
grandchild shall go to the surviving grandchild,
if there be a survivor, and if not, then such share
shall go to Harry Alexander, son of Trustor, or
his then living heirs."
According to the language relied on by the court in
paragraph 5, the respective interests in the beneficiaries
shall in no case vest until said beneficiaries, respectively,
shall ·become entitled to receive ·and demand absolutely
and forthwith the income or principal of the said trust
fund. It is ~submitted that according to the Trust AgreeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1nent in case either one of the grandchildren are under
age at the thne of the death of the surviving trustor,
that since the trustee is given discretion of whether or
not to p·ay from their respective shares any money for his
or her support, n1aintenance, care or education, that at
that ti1ne said beneficiaries cannot absolutely demand any
income or principal fro1n the trust fund. Yet, paragraph 3 speaks of the trustee paying from the "respective
shares" of the beneficiaries and a.ltso speaks of what
should happen to said respective shares in case either
of the two grandchildren shall die before reeeiving the
full portion of the trust fund. This clearly indicates that
the trustors recognized an immediate interest in the
beneficiaries and certainly not a mere expectancy, a.s set
forth by the court in its opinion.
In speaking of a similar type p-roblem in determining
vest'ing under the rule against perpetuities, it is stated in
Spendthrift Trusts 1 2nd Edition, by Erwin N. Griswold,
p·a.r. 280.1:
"There are some decisions to the effect that
a spendthrift trust clause operates to keep the
estate from vesting, and thus makes it invalid
under the rule against perpetuities when it would
otherwise be valid. ·There seems to he no ba:sis
on which such a 'Conclusion can be supported.
A mere restraint on alienation has nothing to do
with 'vesting,' it relates only to the power to
alienate the interest, and the question whether
that interest is 'vested' or not depends on the
contingencies that may affeet the ultimate ownership of the interest - contingencies which do
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not depend on the power of alienations. The
presence or absence of the ordinary restraint on
alienation should therefore have no bearing on
the applicability of the rule against perp·etuities."
And in Note 12 under par. 280.1:
"The Missouri cases cited in Note 10, aborve seem
to 'be examples of this point, turning primarily
on the form of spendthrift trust clause sometimes used in that state. The trust instruments
in question not only expressly restrained alienation but also provided that 'no right or title to
said income or other provision for any such beneficiary shall vest in him or her until the same
shall have been actually paid into his or her
hands.' In holding that the limitations of the
trusts in question violated the rule ·against perpetuities the court took this clause literally. But
~t would seem tolerably clear that the question of
'vesting' is a technical legal one which the se·ttlor
cannot control i1n this way. The court's difficulty
here seems to com.e from the use of the word
tw.o distinct senses, one the teclvnical
'vest'
one. relev(JJYbt to the rule against perpetu~ties, ood
the other synonymous with r.estraimt on alienation. The restraint on 'vesting' imposed by the
settlor did not qualify the beneficiaries' ownershifp of their interests; its only intend:ea; effect
was to restrain alienation of those interests. And
such a restraint should have no bearing on the
application of the rule against p·erpetuities."

m

This Court's opmion is. precariously perched on ·a
narrow and reS'trictive interp·reta tion of the word "vest"
in a spendthrift trust clause. This. word has no mysteriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ous po,,-er of solution in the case a.t bar. Its use and
import has been the subject of discussion by outstanding
authorities in the la'v of trusts.
For exan1ple, see the introduction to Chapte,r 8,
Cases and llfaterials on Futtttre Interests, by W. Barton
Leech. In this introduction Professor Leech has listed
four different llleanings of the word "vested" exrsting
in the law of future interests:
( 1) . A_ n1eaning of vested in possession.

(2) \'ested in interest, meaning that although an
interest is still a future interest, that it is not subject to
a condition precedent other than the determination of the
particular estate.
(3) \!ested in the sense that if the named taker dies
before it becomes possessory, the interest is transmissiblH
to his estate and that his heirs or distributees will take
the interest he would have taken had he lived; and finally,
(-±) The rneaning of the word "ve'St" where the Rule

against Perpetuities is involved, an interest is vested
when it has acquired the degree of certainty which, under
the· rule an interest must acquire within lives and being
and 21 years or fail.
Certainly if the court is relying on the word "vest"
as rneaning vest in possession, then there would never he·
a valid gift over of a remainder in a trust because the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interest of the beneficiary in re·mainder in all such trusts
does not vest in possession until after the death of the
settlor.
If the court is relying on the meaning of "vest" as
distinguished from "contingent" then respondents contend that the opinion is fallacious in that the interest of
a beneficiary ran certainly be ·'contingent" without causing the trust to be testa1nentary. In assuming a situation
w·here a trust is adnlittedly not testamentary, Professor
Scott in 43 Hart·a.rd. Lau· Revie~v, page 524 "Trusts and
The Statute of Wills" states:
"At the tilne of the conveyance the beneficiary
acquires a future interest which may he vested or
contingent."
POINT III.
THIS COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED THAT
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE
INTEREST OF THE BENEFICIARIES DID NOT IMMEDIATELY VEST IN POSSESSION. THE TEST THIS COURT
SHOULD HAVE APPLIED IN DETERMINING VALIDITY OF
THE TRUST AGREEMENT IS WHETHER OR NOT SAID
AGREEMENT BONA FIDELY TRANSFERRED A PROPERTY INTEREST FROM TRUSTOR TO TRUSTEE.

The eourt, in its opinion, has taken the "cart before
the horse." The interest of the beneficiaries should re·sult from the initial determination of whether or not the
trust is valid according to the points argued in the briefs
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on file. If it is detern1ined that the trust is valid, then
it \Yould follo'v that the interest of the beneficiaries. are
"yested'' if the court 'vishes to call it so.
The test as laid do,vn by the cases and authorities on
the subjert as to \vhether or not a trust is testamentary
is \vhether or not there is a valid transfer of the property
fron1 trustor to trustee. In other \vords whether the
purported trust agree1nent is a valid deed or whether
it is an atten1pted 'vill. The authorities uniformly hold
that there is no policy against disposing of property by
1nea.ns of a trust instead of a 'vill. Professor Scott sta.te s
at page 338, \-.-ol. 1, Scott on Trusts:
1

··It is sometilnes suggested that a trust
created inter vivos is invalid if it is made in lieu
of a w,.ill. Such an objection is almost meaningless. Any trust whch is to continue after the
death of the settlor 1nust be created either inter
vivos or by will, and if either form of disposition
is en1ployed it is used in lieu of the other. * * *
It would seem, however, tha:t the disposition is
not to he condemned merely because the settlor
elected to dispose of his property one way rather
than in another."
In the present state of property law it is generally
agreed that future interests can be conveyed. It is stated
in 18 .Blick. L. R. page 470, "When Are Deeds Testanlentary ~" by Henry W. Ballantine:
"But in a majority of states the language
that the deed is 'to be in force or take effect from
and after the decease of the grantor', is interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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preted very liberally. * * * The probable intention is effectuate'd by holding the instrument
operative in praesenti as a grant of future estate.
* * * In view of the act of delivery to the grantee
in the lifetime of the grantor, and the intention
to be gathered from the whole transaction, the
provision that 'title shall not pass until death,'
does not mean that the grantee shall acquire no
right or interest under the deed until the
grantor's death. 'The deed conveys a vested interest to commence in futuro, and necessarily
cuts down the estate remaining in the grantor."
And at 11 A.L.R. 36:

"A deed may pass a present interest in
property, the estate in which is a future one.
One has an interest in property when he presently owns or holds some property rights therein,
regardless of the time at which the estate comes
_into enjoyment."
Also, see J7enters v. Wickens (1906), 224 Ill. 569,
79 N.E. 947, and Jones 1:. Caird (1913), 153 Wis. 384, 141
N.W. 228.
The ultimate question is whether the Trust Agreement in question was intended as a present conveyance
from trustor to ·trustee, or whether it was meant to be
a will. There can be no question 'but that the trustors
meant this to he a present conveyance and the interest
of the beneficiaries to be a present conveyance of a future
estate, one to take effect in enjoyment and possession at
a future time. If the trustors had intended a Will, certainly they would have created a Will. Beside·~, 'a Will
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is an1bulatory and revocable. This instrument was expressly n1ade reYooa.ble and dealt \Vi th specifically designated property. It is stated in the case- of Jon.es v. Ca,ird,
supra:
~'* * * it is a fair presumption that he intended something valid and effectual, rather than
so1nething void and useless."

It is stated in Fonda v. j_lliller (1951), 411 Ill. 74,

103 N.E. 2d 98:
'"Of great importance in our thinking on this
subject is the long uninterrupted line of cases in
this State holding that where there is a deed
reserving a life estate in the grantor, there is a
strong presumption that it is intended that the
title should vest immediately in the remainderman, for the reason that if such intention ha:d
not existed there would be no reason for the reservation."
Of course, if the eourt holds that the settlor retaine d
so 1nuch in the transaction that he actually conveyed
nothing to the trustee, then there would be no trust. How~
ever, if the court holds that the settlor created what he
purported to create, a trust 'vith a conveyance of prop·erty to the trustee, then, whatever one 1nay call the interest of the beneficiary is of no import. Then it is a real
interest existing by reason of the trust an'd n1ust he transferred to 'beneficiaries as provide·d in the trust.
1

The recent leading case of National

Shawm.~~;t

Bank

of Boston et al. v. Joy et al., (1944), 315 Mass. 457, 53
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N .E. 2d 113, contains a very thorough discussion of the
law involved in the case at bar. In that case the settlor
created an intervivos trust of corporate stocks and bonds,
reserving a life estate in himself, plus powers to revoke,
alter or an1end. After settlor's death, the trust provided
for a life estate in one Sophia Brown and after her death
the principal was to be paid over to such person or persons or corporations as the donor may appoint by an
instrument duly acknowledged and under seal and deposited with the trustees, and in default of such appointInent, to such persons as are entitled to settlor's property
under intestacy laws. Settlor died without making an
appointment.
The decision in the case expressly overruled the
earlier ~fassachusetts case of McE,z;oy v. Boston Five
Cents Savings BO!Yitk, 87 N.E. 465, and held that the trust
was valid.
In a separate part of the opinion, the interest of the
beneficiaries was discussed:
"Until Nicholls died, his cousins (heirs under
intestacy law) had not even what has been called
a 'vested', or more properly a transmissible, interest in a contingent remainder * * * which interest
arises where, except for the possible loss of the
property through the exercise of an underlying
power of appointment, the remainderman cannot
fail to take if he lives until the time of ve:sting
* * *, in a precise use of language the interest of
the statutory next of kin was not a 'remainder'
but was properly described as a future inter-est
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'in the nature of an equitable remainder.' * * •
But in current speech it was an equitable contingent remainder. * * * Even if the p·roperty had
been realty, there would have been no need of
tracing a fee into the settlor or his heirs while
the contingency ren1ained undetermined, as in
legal estates at common la'v * * *, for the fact
that the fee would be in the trustees would have
satisfied all the feudal requirements of the common law.***
"Equity has always recognized future and
even executory * * * beneficial interests in realty
or personalty without regard to common law technicalities, and even in favor of unascertainerd or
unborn persons, subject however to the Rule
against Perp·etuities * * *. A trust is valid although the beneficiaries are left to he determined
by the 'vill of the settlor. * * * The selection of
beneficiaries out of a class may he left to the
trustee."

In the above cited case, the fact that the beneficiaries
had no vested interest and were not even discernible at
the time the trust was created, had nothing to do with
the determination in a separate part of the opinion of
whether the trust was real or illusory. The settlor in
the case at bar couldn't possibly have intended to convey
less of an interest to the· beneficiaries specifically nam·ed,
than the settlor in the Joy case did in giving his bene-,
ficiaries what was called not even a vested inlerest in a
contingent remainder.
Another interesting case is VanCott v. PrentiJce an1d
others (1887), 104 N.Y. 45, 10 N.E. 257. In that case
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the settlor deli¥ered securities and an instrument to the
trustee reserving the right of revocation and directing
said trustee to pay the income to Clarence King for the
use of three designated beneficiaries for life and to be
disposed of at settlor's death in accordance with sealed
instructions also delivered at that time to the trustees.
The trust instrument specifically provided:

"* * * and it is hereby declared and made a
condition of these trusts that the beneficiaries
thereof have no legal or equitable right to the principal or income of said securities or investments,
but receive the same only as herein provided, as
preceding solely from the bounty of said Prentice,
and subject to his power to revoke the trusts hereby created."
Also, the trustee was to hold and manage ·the fund
subject to the direction and control of the settlor. The
court held that the trust was valid and not testamentary
and stated in regard to the contention that the ahove
provision made the trust testan1entary:
"The latter provision is plainly but an amplification of the idea involved in the power of revocation; for the grantor adds that the beneficiaries
~hall take what they receive as proceeding from
his bounty, and subject to his right to revoke at
any moment. * * * We ought not to put the creator
of the trust in the attitude of deliberately nullifying his own evident purpose. That he meant to
create an effective trust is beyond all question;
ood a oonstruction which. makes him destroy the
very ·effort to create should not p·revail if there
be an;y other ration.al in.terpretation."
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It \vas also held in the r'"an. Cott case that the sealed
paper "~as to be read as part of the deed and was not
testamentary.
In the l'" an Cott case, it can he seen that although the
beneficiaries in ren1ainder \vere not even known until
after settlor's death "~hen the sealed paper was opened,
and in spite of the specific \\'Ords to the effect that such
beneficiaries had no legal or equitable right until they
received their shares, the obvious intent of the settlor
''Tas carried out and these objections \Vere brushed away
as inconsequential.
The opinion of this Court has misconstrued both
the Joy case and the VanCott case.
A well known principle in trust law is th'H rule allowing a beneficiary to be ascertaine·d by an act which has
significance apart from its effect upon the aisposition
of the trust property. This is illustrated by the following
at p. 332, Vol. 1, Scott on Trusts:

'' * * * as for example, where the settlor transfers property in trust to p~ay income to himself
for life and to distribute the principal among persons in his employ at the time of his death."
In this situation the beneficiary ·cannot even be ascertained until after the death of the settlor and yet there
seems to be no question in such a case of whether or not
the b~neficiary has a vested interest until after the death
of the settlor.
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The recent Utah cas·e of Thatcher et al. v. Merrimwn
et al., (1952), ...... Utah------, 240 P. 2d 266, dealt with a de- .
cedent who assigned to defendants a promissory note retaining the right to receive all of the installments of
principal paid on the note during assignor's lifetime.
It was held by this Court that this constituted a present
gift of such part of the principal as did not be-come due
and was not paid during the lifetime of the assignor and
therefore not invalid as a testamentary disposition.
The above cases and authorities establish very definitely that whether the beneficiaries' in ter·est is deemed
vested, contingent, or called any other name iis not controlling in determining whether th·e trust in question is
real or illusory. This question should be decided by detennining whether or not there was a real transfer of
property fron1 trustor to trustee. If there was such a
transfer then the interest of the beneficiaries will aCcordingly be determined to be a real interest and not a
mere expectancy, whether it be deemed vested or contingent.
CONCLUSION
It is repectfully submitted that respondents should
be granted a rehearing for the following reasons:
(1) Respond'ents have had no opportunity to argue
before this Court the novel and unprecedented theory
upon which this Court's opinion was based.
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(2)

Thi~

Court 1nisconstrued the intent. of the two

· settlors \Yhieh is 1nanifested time and again throughout
the trust docu1nent, by taking out of context and meaning
fron1 the

~pendthrift

clause the \Yords "shall in no case

vest''. There is a specific intent to create real interests
in the beneficiaries expressed .even in the spendthrift
clause itself. Further1nore, the word

~'vest"

in a spend-

thrift clause has a n1eaning connected with restraint on
alienation and has no significance with respect to creation of a property interest.
(3)

This Court has attempted to solve the.

p~roblem

of \Yhether the purported trust is real or illusory 'by fallaciously reasoning from effect to cause. The correct test
should be to determine whether the transaction in question \\"as real or illusory. The determination of this question will decide ·w··hether or not the beneficiaries have an
interest in the property in question.
This Court's opinion is based on a narrow construction which has defeated the intent of the two settlors
to dispose of their property in such a way that their heirs
could eventually have it after the de·ath of the survivor.
The evolution of property law has been away from the
strict, the technical, and the narrow, toward liberally attenlpting to allow persons to dispose of their property
as they see fit.
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This Court, by narrowly and strictly interp·reting
the trust instrument, has thwarted the intent of two
elderly people to bestow upon their own descendants the
bounty of their joint life's effort. It is our sincere hope
that this ·Court will not allow such a gross mis·carriage.
of justice to stand.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN L. BLACK
Attorney for Respo'J'«l,ents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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